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associated with different dominant technologies. Within any era, industry concen-
tration tends to grow. Particular eras are broken by the introduction of a new
technology which, while initially inferior to the established one in the prominent
uses, has the potential to become competitive. In many case new entrants survive
and grow, and the large established firms do not make the transition. In other cases,
the established firms are able to switch over effectively, and compete in the new era.
This paper explores a model which generates this pattern and has focused on the
characteristics of the demand. We argue that the ability of the new firms exploring
the new technology to survive long enough to get that technology effectively
launched depends on the existence of fringe markets which the old technology does
not serve well, or experimental users, or both. Established firms initially have little
incentive to adopt the new technology, which initially is inferior to the technology
they have mastered. New firms generally cannot survive in head-to-head conflict
with established firms on the market well served by the latter. The new firms need to
find a market that keeps them alive long enough so that they can develop the new
technology to a point where it is competitive on the main market. Niche markets, or
experimental users, can provide that space.
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1 Introduction
The hypothesis, or theory, that a product technology and the associated industry
structure tend to have a natural life cycle first originated among business school
scholars (see in particular Abernathy and Utterrback 1978), but in recent years has
been picked up by a number of economists (see for example Nelson 1994; Klepper
1996; and Malerba et al. 1999). Most versions of this theory posit that, when a
technology is new, no version of it is completely satisfactory, many different firms
try to produce and sell different variants, but none is able to achieve a large market.
In the early stages of the life cycle, there is considerable entry to the market both of
firms and of customers, and a lot of exit as well. However with time, the technology
stabilizes and so does industry structure, which generally becomes quite concentrated.
The versions of the theory that were articulated first stressed supply side
dynamics. After a certain amount of experimentation, a version of the product is
found or developed that satisfactorily meets the needs of a large block of customers.
Customers gravitate to that version, which becomes the dominant design, and firms
must produce that version if they are to survive. With the product market now more
homogeneous, and design more stabilized, firms are able to take advantage of
cumulative learning, scale intensive production methods become profitable and are
adopted, entry becomes more difficult, and industry structure tends to concentrate. In
some versions of this supply side theory, successful firms consolidate and advance
their advantage by plowing their profits back into R&D.
More recently, there have been versions of this theory that stress demand side
dynamics. A dominant design emerges and industry stabilization occurs not so much
because a particular satisfactory technological mode is found, but rather because
there are network economies or bandwagon effects on the demand side. Thus
customers gravitate to a particular design, and firms must also if they are to survive.
In most of the models stressing demand side dynamics, with the development of a
dominant design industry structure tends to concentrate, just as in the models
stressing supply side dynamics.
These theories are not mutually exclusive. In a number of industry histories, it is
apparent that both supply-side dynamics and demand-side dynamics led to
increasing industry concentration.
Clearly not all technologies and industries display historical patterns that fit the
life cycle story, and for many reasons. In the first place, many industries face a
diverse set of customers and no single design ever emerges that satisfies all needs.
Custom software is a good example. If one aggregates across different kinds of
drugs, the pharmaceutical industry remains relatively unconcentrated because a
variety of different types of drugs are needed to meet the diverse requirements of
different humans with different ailments. (See e.g. Sutton 1991, 1998; Malerba and
Orsenigo 2002). Cameras and sound amplifications systems, as reported by
Windrum and Birchenhall (1998) are additional relevant cases. In some industries
there would seem to be little in the way of economies of scale or cumulative learning
advantages that would induce firms to grow large, and the productivity of large scale
R&D is low. The housing and trucking industries have always been fragmented.
It also is apparent that a number of industries that display dynamics that fit the
broad technology and industry cycle theory over certain bounded periods of time, do
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not do so when a longer time horizon is considered. In particular, their technological
histories are marked by a succession of different broad technologies, with one
technology being dominant in one era, but then being succeeded by another
technology that then is dominant for a while, and so on. Of particular interest, the
firms that become dominant during one era often fail to hold their strong position
after a new technology enters the picture. Rather, the new era belongs to new firms.
A considerable body of research and writing, a significant portion of it by
economists, has developed and supported the argument that the effective transition to
a new technology, and the changing of the locus of industrial leadership, are causally
connected (Tushman and Anderson (1986), Henderson and Clark (1990), Christensen
and Rosenbloom (1995)). The dominant firms of one technological era often have
great difficulty seeing the advantages of the new technology, or learn to use it
effectively, and the development of that new technology, therefore, becomes the
business of new firms to the industry.
In this essay, we pick up on these themes, and argue the following supplementary
hypothesis. The successful introduction of radically new technology in an industry,
where a dominant design and a small collection of dominant firms had emerged
using the older technology, may be dependent upon the presence of a group of
experimental customers, or diverse preferences and needs among potential users, or
both. If customers are not willing to experiment, and all potential customers have
roughly the same tastes, the new firms that may be needed to introduce the new
technology will not have enough of a market to stay around long enough to become
viable. Despite the opportunities afforded by a potentially powerful new technology,
the industry will stay stuck with the old.
This hypothesis was virtually forced on us by our analysis of the evolution of
computer technology and industrial structure (see Malerba et al. 1999). The dramatic
advances in computer performance that have occurred over the last 40 years have
been largely driven by a succession of major advances in component technologies.
In no case has the firm that had market and technological leadership under one
regime of components been the leader in developing and marketing computers
employing the next generation of components. In each case, new firms were key
players in the transformation of the technologies and the industry. And in each case,
the new firms got their start selling to experimental users, or to users whose needs
were inadequately met by computers based on the older component technology. We
will argue there that there are many other industry histories that look like the
computer case.
In Section 2, we situate our argument within the context of the literature that has
analyzed the role of heterogeneity in demand in preventing the establishment of a
dominant design and/or lock-in into inferior, older technologies.
In Section 3, we develop a simulation model of technology and industry
dynamics in which there is a succession of potentially dominant technologies. The
model is based on our previous work on the evolution of the computer industry
(Malerba et al. 1999). However, that model has been adapted in order to address the
questions under examination. We shall highlight these modifications when
discussing the model in detail. Moreover, it has to be emphasized here that this
model is not “history-friendly” in the strict meaning that we attributed to our
previous efforts (Malerba et al. 1999; Malerba and Orsenigo 2002). While those
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earlier efforts were built with the explicit aim at qualitatively examining the main
causal factors and processes that could explain the evolution of a particular industry
(computers and pharmaceuticals), here we use and develop one of those models for
investigating a more general phenomenon that––we argue––applies to a variety of
industries. Thus, we claim that a history-friendly model is used here to develop and
probe a theoretical and empirical argument of broad relevance for various historical
cases.
In Section 4 we discuss and model how under any regime defined by a particular
technology there are forces that drive a technology and industry structure life cycle.
There are dynamic increasing returns on the supply side and, in our base set of
runs, network externalities or bandwagon effects on the demand side. Then along
comes a potentially superior new technology, and some new firms that give it a try.
To be successful, they need to pick up some customers pretty quickly, in order to
have the cash flow to develop their new technology to a point where its potential is
realized.
Then in Section 5 we analyze various demand contexts. In our first set of runs,
new firms try to introduce the new technology but they do not have a chance.
Bandwagon effects are too high, and established leaders in the market do not have
the incentive to adopt the new technology. In our second set of runs, we eliminate
the bandwagon effect, which obviously has the consequence of making it difficult
for new firms to find a market. However, in these runs customers are sophisticated,
in the sense that they can accurately assess the quality of the products offered by
different suppliers (there is no bandwagon effect) and preferences are homogeneous.
We show that, in this case, too, if the new technology needs work before its potential
is realized, and established firms are not interested in doing that work and hence the
task falls to new entrants, sophisticated customers who see the potential in the new
designs but prefer not to buy if products of the old design are still superior, act to
wall off the new entrants from finding a profitable market, even if there are no strong
bandwagon effects.
In runs three and four, we change the situation. In the third set of runs, there is a
group of customers who have a policy of experimenting. The introduction of
experimental users constitutes a major change as compared to our earlier model.
They will buy some of the products based on the new technology, simply because
they are new, and will not be deterred from that experimentation simply because the
quality of the new products is not up to that which they had been buying. In the fourth
set of runs, there is a group of customers with very different tastes than the customers
who had been buying the old products, whose needs, however, can be met with the
new technology. In both cases, the new firm, and the new technology, is able to get a
foothold in the industry.
In Section 6 we show that even the old consumers over the long run may be
significantly better off for this. Firms producing products using the new technology
are profitable, and plow back their funds to further improving their technology.
Established firms now are challenged by these new ones, and they change over their
own practices. The result is that, down the road, products using the new technology
come to dominate the market. Convergence of the two markets is also a new feature
of this model as compared to the old one.
In our concluding section, we briefly discuss the implications of these findings.
374 F. Malerba et al.
2 Previous literature
In recent years, a number of models has focused attention on differences in
consumers’ preferences as an important factor influencing the industry life cycle and
in some cases preventing the establishment of a dominant design. Thus, Saviotti
(1996), Dalle (1997) and Windrum and Birchenhall (1998) model the industry life
cycle ending up in the emergence of multiple, distinct market niches as a
consequence of various forms of heterogeneity in consumers preferences. Our
model, however, is not primarily interested in showing that different technologies
and related products can survive, compete and co-exist over the course of an
industry life cycle. Rather, our main interest is in examining the conditions at which
a new potentially superior technology can fail to win market domination or even to
survive and conversely how heterogeneity in demand can break the dominance of
the older technology.
From this perspective, this paper naturally links with earlier contributions that,
developing on the work by Christensen (1997), have examined how demand
conditions can set on (or prevent) phenomena of technological disruption. In
particular, Shy (1996), Dalle (1997), Adner and Levinthal (2001), Adner (2003) and
Windrum and Birchenhall (2005) focus attention on how (alternative structures of)
heterogeneity in consumers preferences influence the conditions at which a new
technology can survive and eventually become displace the old one. Almost all of
these models (particularly Shy (1996), Dalle (1997), and Windrum and Birchenhall
(2005)) deal with cases where the continuing dominance of the older technology
derives from the presence of network externalities.
However, our model differs from these previous contributions under a variety of
aspects, even leaving aside important technical differences in the specific ways the
models are built. First, our paper does not consider network externalities or
bandwagon effects in demand as the only mechanism leading to a dominant design
and to industry concentration. On the contrary, the same effect can arise in the
presence of sophisticated consumers who are able to select always the best available
design. Second, in our model the new technology is initially inferior to the old one
but it has the potential to become better in terms of all the relevant product
characteristics. The survival and growth of the new technology is made possible not
only by the existence of groups of consumers having different preferences over
product characteristics, but also by the existence of a niche of consumers who are
simply willing to experiment the new inferior products. In this respect, the situation
we examine is different from the models by Shy (1996) (where the new technology
offers additional product characteristics) and by Windrum and Birchenhall (2005)
(where substitution may occur only through the emergence of a new consumer class
with new preference sets). Third, in our model, it is not only new firms that can
bring the new technology to dominance. Also old firms can adopt the new
technology and thereby maintain their market leadership, provided that the
competition of new entrants can become strong enough to trigger adoption.
The model presented here shares also some similarities and differences with
Adner (2003). There, the new technology is initially inferior to the old one in terms
of the performance dimensions that are more important to “mainstream” consumers,
but it offers more in terms of different (“secondary”) characteristics. However, the
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mechanism leading to either disruption, competition or co-existence of the new and
old technologies are quite different. In particular, Adner’s model assumes decreasing
marginal utility to consumers from increases in products functionalities beyond their
requirements, Thus, technological substitution occurs because incumbent firms
“oversupply” the mainstream product characteristics, leaving increasing room to new
products which offer more secondary characteristics and are therefore increasingly
valued (at the margin) by consumers. Our model is similar to Adner’s in that it
assumes that the new technology allows more progress along a specific product
characteristic that was not valued very much by “mainstream” consumers. However,
our model does not rely on the assumption of decreasing marginal utility of
mainstream characteristics. Rather, the new technology has the potential to become
superior in terms of all the relevant product characteristics.
Thus, our model can be considered as a simpler baseline and possibly more
general case of the models mentioned previously. The model identifies in fact the
broad classes of variables which, on the demand side, can prevent the take-off of a
new superior technology or break the dominance of the old one. The model can in
principle be modified to consider more specific cases (e.g. emergence of new classes
of consumers, technologies offering new characteristics, economies of scale in
production) as well as other more specific mechanisms influencing technological
transitions, like those discussed especially in Adner (2003) and Windrum and
Birchenhall (2005).
3 The basic model and product life cycle dynamics
In this section we lay out the basic model. Given the nature of complex simulation
models, it is impossible to present all the details of all the equations, without
befuddling the reader and obscuring the basic logic of the model. We have tried,
therefore, to lay out in transparent form what we regard as the gist. Interested readers
may obtain a full copy of the simulation model by writing to the authors.
We start by considering the situation when a new product has just been invented.
That product has the potential to get sales in a market, but it has to be developed
and perfected before it can actually meet the potential market demand. Moreover,
the current conception of the product and the technology it embodies has inherent
limits.
To make the discussion concrete, let the product be the first generation of
electronic computers. The potential purchasers of computers value two attributes.
One is the “performance” of the computer. The other is its price, or “cheapness.” The
desirability of any computer design can be summarized in terms of how it rates in
those two dimensions of Lancaster attribute space. By a useful product we mean one
that meets threshold requirements of potential purchasers—more on this shortly.
The innate characteristics of product designs of this first generation limit what
products can achieve in these two dimensions, even when those designs are
perfected. For analytic convenience, we treat these technological constraints as
defining a rectangular box. Thus in Fig. 1 the outer boundaries of the box mark the
set of technological characteristics that potentially can be achieved by products of
this first generation.
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These outer limits of what is feasible under the current technology are
“potentials.” The potential is not achievable, however, without significant invest-
ment of resources in research and development, and requires learning from
experience. The first efforts of a new firm trying to design a product will only be
able to achieve a design characterized by point Z (for zero experience). We will
specify the dynamics of design improvement built into the model in Section 3.2.
3.1 The market
Later in this essay we will consider a market that consists of different subgroups of
potential customers who value the two product attributes––cheapness and perfor-
mance––differently1. For the present we consider only one homogeneous group of
potential customers. Before members of this group can be induced to buy any
products at all, a product offered to them must meet certain threshold requirements.
Once these threshold requirements are met, the value that customers place on a
product is an increasing function of its cheapness and performance. In Fig. 3 we
depict the preferences of the customers that can be induced to buy some of these first
generation products, if they are good enough.
The “indifference curves” of Fig. 2 depict designs of equal value or “merit” in the
eyes of customers. Product designs whose characteristics fall outside the box, that is
that do not meet threshold requirements, have a merit of zero. For the time being, let
us just note that we assume that higher product merit translates into more products
bought by customers.
3.2 Supply dynamics
In our model, firms gradually and cumulatively develop competence in using the
new technology as a result of the R&D investments they make. Our model of firm
learning is meant to capture significant elements of the “dynamic competence”
theory of the firm that has been developed by Nelson and Winter (1982), Winter
1 These subgroups can be interpreted as collections of consumers having similar preferences or even as
individual consumers
Z  Performance
Cheapness 
Fig. 1 Technological frontier of the first generation products
Demmand, innovation, and the dynamics of market structure 377
(1987), Dosi and Marengo (1993), and Teece et al. (1992, 1994). Our model also
incorporates the fact that in this industry, and in a number of others, a considerable
period may go by after a firm starts trying to operate in a new technology before it is
able to sell any product, if it ever achieves that. At the start it must have external
financing.
Thus at the beginning of our episode, we assume that there are a number of firms,
each endowed by “venture capitalists” with an initial budget to spend on R&D, who
hope to exploit the new technological opportunities. All firms start with the same
initial design capabilities, depicted by Z in Fig. 1. Firms start off with different,
randomly selected initial budgets, B, which are used to finance an R&D program,
the length of which is fixed and equal for all firms. During this initial time, in each
Product life cycle 
Standard set 
Herfindahl index
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100 109 118 127 136 145
bw 2 ds 2
Number of firms
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100 109 118 127 136 145
bw 2 ds 2
Herfindahl index
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100 109 118 127 136 145
bw 5 ds 2
bw 2 ds 5
Number of firms
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
1 13 25 37 49 61 73 85 97 109 121 133 145
bw  5 ds 2
bw  2 ds 5
Fig. 3 Product life cycle and standard set (bw= bandwagon; ds = design sensitivity)
Z 
Cheapness 
Performance
Fig. 2 The indifference curves
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period firms spend a constant fraction of their budget on R&D. If the funds are
exhausted before a marketable design is achieved, firms exit.
Design outcomes are influenced by firm-specific strategies represented by choices
of search direction in the capabilities space. In our model these strategies are
reflected in randomly selected trajectories of technological improvement along the
two technological dimensions, price and performance. It is assumed that trajectories
are firm-specific and time-invariant. Thus, after the initial period, the firms in the
industry will be doing different things, and will be achieving product designs of
different characteristics.
As firms spend down their initial loan doing R&D, from period to period the
quality of the design that a company is able to achieve in each relevant dimension––
performance and cheapness––improves according to the following equation:
change Xi ¼ a0 Rið Þa1 Li  Xið Þa2 ð1Þ
The first variable, R, is the firm’s R&D expenditure aimed at achieving design
improvements of a particular sort, where i=1 denotes performance and i=2 denotes
cheapness. This expenditure is a constant fraction of its period-by-period R&D
expenditures in total.
The second variable in the equation, Li−Xi, is distance of the achieved design to
the frontier. As what is achieved comes closer and closer to the limits of what is
achievable, a given R&D expenditure will achieve less and less further progress.
As indicated, if a firm runs through its initial loan before it achieves a marketable
product, it simply fails. However, if a firm manages to push its design into the region
where customers are buying, it is a new ball game. Now funds from revenues can be
invested in R&D.
Profits, p are calculated in each period t as:
pt ¼ M  pM  k; ð2Þ
where M is the number of products sold, p is the product price and k is production
cost of a single c product. Production costs, k, are determined by the technical
progress function. Price is obtained by adding a mark-up, μ, to costs:
p ¼ k  1þ mð Þ ð3Þ
The mark-up, μ, is initially set equal for all firms, but that subsequently it can
vary over time as a function of the market share that has been achieved. In particular,
we assume that as firms gain monopoly power, they (partly) exploit it by charging a
higher mark-up. Specifically
μt ¼ 0:9  μt1 þ 0:1  ðmi= η mið Þ ð4Þ
where η is the elasticity of demand (equal to 2 in the first market and to 4 in the
new market in the parametrization used here) and m is the firm’s market share.
The gross margin over production costs is used to cover several things. Firms
spend a constant fraction σ (15% for all firms in this version of the model) of their
profits in each period to pay back their debt Dt to investors—that is to say, the initial
budget capitalized at the current interest rate, r, until the debt has been fully paid
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back. What is left of the initial loan in each period is reinvested in R&D. R&D
expenditure, Rt, is determined as a constant fraction, ϕ, of what is left of gross
profits, πt, after the repayment of the initial budget
Rt; ¼ φ  πt 1 σð Þ ð5Þ
In this version of the model this fraction is the same for all firms and constant
over time.
The excess gross profits after debt repayment and R&D expenditures is invested
in an account, Bt, that yields the interest rate, r, in each period and is treated in this
model as “reserves.” These reserves will enter the model in an important way when
we shall examine the case of a new technology becoming available as an alternative
component technology.
Firms exit the market when their budget becomes negative (because current
profits are insufficient to pay back the due fraction of the outstanding debt) and/or
when their rate of profit becomes negative and it has been falling faster than a given
rate (a parameter of the model) over the past four periods. (See Appendix 1 for
details)
3.3 Demand dynamics
The customers in our model are visualized as shopping around at any time, and
homing in on a particular product as a candidate for purchase. They are drawn to a
particular product by their assessment of its “merit,” which is a Cobb Douglas
function of its two valued attributes, performance and cheapness, each attribute
measured from its threshold value:
M ¼ b0 X1  X1 minð Þb1 X2  X2 minð Þb2 ð6Þ
However, customers do not have perfect ex-ante information about the merits of
the available products, while they have access to some direct indicators (for example
engineering reports) they also use various indirect indicators that they think are
related to merit to focus their attention. In particular, the larger is the share of the
market that a product already holds, the greater the likelihood that a customer will
consider that product. Thus a bandwagon effect is built into this model. The
particular rationale invoked here is that use by others provides an indication that the
product has relatively high merit, but there may be other reasons as well why a
potential customer might be attracted to bands that are selling well.
Putting these two variables together, the probability that any customer will
consider a particular product for purchase in a particular period is:
Pi ¼ c0 Mið Þcl mi þ d1ð Þc2 ð7Þ
c0 is specified so that the sum of the probabilities adds to one. As noted, M
denotes the “merit” of a product. “m” is the market share, in terms of the fraction of
total sales revenues accounted for by that product. We note that the market share
variable can be interpreted either in terms of a bandwagon effect, or a (probabilistic)
lock-in of customers who previously had bought machines of a particular brand. The
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“d1” assures that products that have just broken into the market, and have no prior
sales, can attract some sale.
Above we proposed that the logic of our model implies that the greater the merit
of a product, the more of that product should be sold to customers who are looking
at it. We now adopt the simple assumption that a potential customer who is
considering a particular product of merit M, will buy M units of that product. If the
notion of a single customer buying many products is bothersome to the reader, think
of the customer as a large organization, or a collection of smaller ones or individuals.
Thus if there are N customer or customer groups on the market, the expected amount
of sales of a product of merit M will be
Expected number of sales ¼ NPM ð8Þ
Note the following. First, if there is only one product that meets threshold
requirements, each customer or customer group will buy it with probability 1, and
will buy “M” units of it. Second, if there is more than one product that passes the
threshold, then if “c1” is very high, and “c2” is very low, virtually all the customers
will buy the product with the highest merit score. On the other hand, if “c1” is
relatively low, or “c2” is high, a higher merit product design may be “out sold” by a
rival product that has the higher existing market share.
3.4 A product life cycle
Our first simulation replicates the essential features of an industry life cycle. The
reported results for the relevant variables on which we have concentrated our
attention are the means of extensive Monte Carlo exercises (1,000 runs for each
exercise). Sensitivity and robustness analysis are reported in Appendix 3. For each of
the following simulations, Appendix 3 reports mean, standard deviation and
confidence intervals for the main variables under investigation.
Product life cycle features emerge clearly under average values of the bandwagon
effect (bw) and design sensitivity (ds), each set equal to 2 (see Appendix 2) for the
description of parameters values). In fact after an initial entry of new firms, the
industry gets concentrated as the industry matures and few firms survive (see
Fig. 3—Product life cycle). In this case, six initial firms were potential entrants, 3–
3.5 of them entered the industry and between 2 and 2.5 survived in the long run and
dominated the market.
Then we have simulated the model by using a parametrization that we call the
“standard set,” in which either the bandwagon effect or design sensitivity are high.
The details of the parameter setting are provided in Appendix 2. Also these
simulations generate an industry history which replicates the essential features of the
product life cycle model, but with a greater level of concentration. Results are shown
in Fig. 3. As in the previous simulation, the industry gets concentrated rather
quickly. Here however a dominant firm emerges and maintains its leadership for a
long period of time. This result emerges as the consequence of a “success-breeds-
success” process. In turn, this feature is the result of the interplay of three factors.
First, technical progress is cumulative. Today’s design efforts build on what was
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achieved yesterday and firms tend to get better and better at the particular things
they are doing. Second, an early leader will gain a large market share and hence
profits that allow for higher R&D expenditures as compared to the rivals. As a
result, the ‘merit’ of the early leader’s computers will tend to be enhanced relative
to those of its competitors. Third, the bandwagon effect in the demand function
(the parameter c2 in the demand function (7) set equal to 5) further magnifies the
initial advantage: a larger market share at time t will attract other customers at time
t+1. The same holds in the case of high design sensitivity by consumers (the
parameter c1 in the demand function (7) set equal to 5), who flock always to the
current best design.
This process is only partially countervailed by the onset of diminishing returns to
R&D towards the end of the runs. As the best products get close to the boundaries,
their rate of technological advance slows down and laggards begin to catch up.
However, the bandwagon effect in the demand function shelters the dominant firm
position from the increased technological competitiveness of rival products and
concentration remains high.
4 The emergence of a new product design
Let us now introduce a new feature into the basic model. Assume that at a certain
time t* a new technology emerges, which opens a “second generation” of product
designs. The new technology is potentially superior to the old one in the sense that it
allows, in principle, the design of products that are better than “first generation” ones
regarding both characteristics, performance, and cheapness. In other words, as
shown in Fig. 4, the new technology defines new boundaries to the technological
characteristics that potentially can be achieved.
As with the old technology, however, the new product designs have to be developed
and perfected.
4.1 Competition between technologies and adoption with “locked-in” effects
The introduction of the new technology is associated to the entry of new firms. A
number of new firms start out at point “Z” in Fig. 4, with funding provided by venture
Z Performance
Cheapness
Old
Technology
New
Technology
Fig. 4 New technology defining new boundaries to the technological characteristics of products
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capitalists, just as earlier new firms had started out at that point using the old tech-
nology. Some of these firms will fail before they get into a market. Others may succeed.
However, the existence of established firms in the market creates a significant
barrier to entry. First of all, if a “new generation” firm achieves a design that meets
threshold requirements in the market, that product is in competition with existing
products that already have achieved higher than threshold quality levels. Second, the
established firms have acquired positive market share which, in itself, attracts and
holds the attention of customers, and makes it hard for new products to be seen. It is
clearly difficult in this context for a new firm to survive, even if it succeeds in
cracking into the market at small scale. If new firms can’t survive, and if extant firms
cannot or do not switch over to making product designs using the new technology,
the potential afforded by the new technology will never be realized.
In the model, extant firms who have been using the old technology have the
capability to switch over to the new, but it is costly to do so, and unless pressed by new
firms the motivation may be weak. We noted in the introduction to this paper that
established firms often are sluggish and unsuccessful in adopting new technologies.
We make the probability that an established firm will try to adopt the new
technology a function of two variables. One is the extent to which new firms, or
other old firms that have adopted, have developed the new technology to a point
where the merit of the product based on it is close to the merit of products using the
old technology. The second variable is the extent to which established firms are
pressing close on the borders of the feasible using the old technology. The precise
specification is laid out in the Appendix 1.
5 The role of experimental users and users with different preferences.
In this Section, we explore the role of demand in affecting technological change and
industrial dynamics. First, we show that using what we called the “standard set,” the
new firms are unable to get a viable foothold in the old market and nothing induces
the dominant old firms to switch over to the new technology. We show also that this
result is not simply an artifact of a strong bandwagon effect, but that the new
technology fails to take off in this model even if there is no bandwagon effect, at
least if consumers are sophisticated, i.e. they tend to choose (almost) always the best
available product at any given period.
Second, we show that the existence of experimental users, i.e. customers who
attribute an intrinsic merit to a product simply because it embodies the new
technology, can break the lock-in and allow the new technology to take-off. Third,
we show that the same result can be obtained if there are customers with diverse
preferences about the characteristics of the products.
Fourth, and finally, we show that in the long run the existence of experimental
users and/or diverse preferences benefits all types of consumers.
5.1 Blockaded entry
We start by simulating the model under the standard set. In this case (Fig. 5), the
new technology does not take off. This result stems first of all, from the
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cumulativeness of technical advance coupled with strong bandwagon effects on the
demand side built into these runs. As a result, incumbents have such a large market
share and demand is so locked-in to existing technologies that a new technology
cannot possibly take off. New firms spending down their initial loans can achieve
product designs that meet threshold requirements, but do not survive for long in the
market where they are competing with established firms offering polished first
generation products. Thus the new technology does not develop enough to make it
competitive and, as a consequence, incumbents do not feel any pressure to adopt the
new technology.
However, this result is not simply an artifact of a strong bandwagon. To show this, in
Simulation II of Fig. 5, we eliminate the bandwagon effect, and we consider a situation
in which consumers are highly sophisticated. Thus we put the exponent of the market
share equal to zero and we increase the exponent of the design sensitivity parameter
(c1 in the demand equation) to 5. In this case customers can assess very well the
quality of the products offered by different suppliers and choose at any time the best
available product. Customer tastes however are homogeneous. As Fig. 5 shows, also
in this case the new technology is not able to take off. All the sophisticated customers
prefer to buy the products with the most advanced design. The new technology has a
very high potential but starts from a lower level than the existing one and it is not
chosen by sophisticated customers. Thus, new entrants do not survive and the new
technology does not have the opportunity to develop. The established leaders are not
threatened by the new firms and don’t realize that the new technology might be better
in the future. Thus, the established leaders do not adopt the new technology.
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5.2 Experimental users
Under what conditions could the new technology develop? One possibility is perfect
foresight on the part of consumers, and a willingness to incur costs today for the
benefit of getting better products tomorrow. In this case, purchase decisions will take
into account that the new technology is potentially better and this might enable the
new products to crack into the market and get a significant market share. However,
this presumes greater ability at technology forecasting than is reasonable, and in any
case customers have little incentive to subsidize the new technology with their
purchases of inferior products, since the benefits of the new technology taking off
are, to a considerable extent a “public good.”
On the other hand, the histories of technological advance often have been
influenced by the presence of a group of experimental users. In the following
simulations, it is assumed that a set of experimental users exists who will buy products
based on the new technology, simply because they are new, and will not be deterred
from that experimentation simply because the quality of the new products is not up to
that which they had been buying. We have represented this situation in Fig. 6, where a
group of customers likes experimenting and buy products with the new technology.
In this case we have examined two scenarios, one with a high bandwagon (bw=5,
Fig. 6a) and the other with high design sensitivity (ds=5, Fig. 6b). In the runs we
have a case in which experimental customers constitute only 10% of the total
demand, another in which they reach 20%, and a third one in which they are 30%. In
all cases the new technology takes off, first through the survival of the new entrants
and later, induced by the success of the new firms, through the adoption of the new
technology by established firms. When experimental users represent only a small
fraction of the market, the new entrants are allowed to survive for a while. They will
develop the new technology enough to trigger the industry leader to adopt it. After
adoption, the dominant firm reinforces its advantage and shake-out occurs, with the
new firms exiting the market. In the case of a larger share of experimental users
(20%), the new firms with the new technology do not only survive briefly, but are
also able to establish and hold a non-trivial position in the market.
Finally, a large share of experimental users (30%) allows a change in market
leadership between the established and the new firms in two cases out of five (high
bandwagon setting) and in one third of the cases (high design sensitivity setting). In
these cases, the new firms grow rapidly and dominate the market.
Thus, these results suggest that for the diffusion of the new technology to take
place it is not strictly necessary that the new firms survive in the long run. It is
enough that they survive for some time in order to improve the new technology
sufficiently to make it visible and thus to force adoption by the incumbents (who are
also starting to experience diminishing returns in their technical advance, because
they are approaching the technological frontier related to the old technology).
5.3 Diverse Preferences
A second route through which new technology which is potentially superior to the old,
but which requires considerable work before its potential is realized, gets brought to
the market is through incubation in a separate market. Thus in Fig. 7 we introduce a
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second group of potential customers, a group that greatly values cheapness. First
generation products could not achieve the threshold demands of this second group, and
they were left out in the cold. On the other hand, with second generation technology,
products that meet this group’s threshold demands can be provided.
Indeed, the fact that there are no first generation products, or companies producing
them, that meet the demands of user group 2 means that that market is open to the new
firms using second generation technology. The products they introduce to that market
do not face competition from refined first generation products.
In runs of the model in which there is such a second market, unserved by first
generation products, but approachable by firms using second generation technology,
second generation firms do crack into that market. In the first market second
generation firms continue to be losers. However, the new technology and the second
generation firms that are nurtured in the second market have as effect the adoption of
the new technology in the first market. This is shown in Fig. 8.
5.4 From incubation to new dominant technology
Experimental users, and a separate market, both provide spaces for firms using a
new technology to develop, without confronting the old dominant firms at least at
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Fig. 6 a Experimental users with a high bandwagon, b Experimental users with high design sensitivity
386 F. Malerba et al.
the start. As we have just seen, for a new technology that requires considerable work
before it can compete with polished products of an older technology, dominant firms
employing that older technology are not motivated to adopt unless under
considerable pressure: hence the new technology can get developed only through
the efforts of new firms. This incubator space may be necessary if the promise of the
new is ever to emerge.
But if the second generation firms in the new market receive sufficient funds, with
time their products will become competitive. The way we have modeled the new
market, the products that are sold there are not capable early in the game of attracting
customers from the main market. But, if these products continue to improve along
their trajectories, with time some of them may come to meet and exceed threshold
requirements of the main market.
In either case, when this happens, the established firms had better pay attention,
or risk losing out to the new comers. And in our model, they will, as Fig. 8 shows:
the two markets converge and the second generation firms come to dominate also the
first market.
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Fig. 7 Entrance of new group of customers (2) that greatly values cheapness
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6 Conclusions
The history of a number of industries is marked by a succession of eras, with different
eras associated with different dominant technologies. Within any era, industry
concentration tends to grow, because of dynamic economies of scale on both the
supply side and the demand side. Particular eras are broken by the introduction of a new
technology which, while initially inferior to the established one in the prominent uses,
has the potential to become competitive. In many cases new entrants rather than the
established firms are the vehicles through which the new technology is introduced. Very
often the large established firms do not make the transition, and if the new technology
takes hold sooner or later they are replaced by new firms. In other cases the established
firms of the old era are able to switch over effectively, and compete in the new era. In
either case, the process of concentration begins again, until it is broken (again) by the
advent of a new technology.
This paper has explored a model which generates this pattern. The focus of our
analysis has been on the characteristics of the demand for the products of the
industry. We have argued that the ability of the new firms exploring the new
technology to survive long enough to get that technology effectively launched
depends on the existence of fringe markets which the old technology does not
serve well, or experimental users, or both. Established firms initially have little
incentive to adopt the new technology, which initially is inferior to the technology
they have mastered. New firms generally cannot survive in head-to-head conflict
with established firms on the market well served by the latter. The new firms need
to find a market that keeps them alive long enough so that they can develop the
new technology to a point where it is competitive on the main market. Niche
markets, or experimental users, can provide that space.
The stimulus for this analysis has come from our research on the computer
industry, and we believe the model fits very well there. But there are many other
industries where this analysis also seems to apply.
Thus, when transistors were first introduced as a potential substitute for vacuum
tubes, in most uses they were inferior. However, in the Unites States the
Department of Defense recognized the potential advantages of transistors in
several of the weapons systems it was contemplating. The American Department
of Defense thus provided a special market for transistors, and companies selling
almost exclusively to that specialized market were able to survive and advance
transistor technology to a point where it could compete effectively with vacuum
tubes in a wide range of civilian uses. By the mid-1970s, transistors had virtually
eliminated vacuum tubes from those markets.
The American Department of Defense also provided a (large) niche market that
induced the development of aircraft jet engines. Without that specialized market, it
is likely that jet engine technology would have developed much more slowly. As it
happened, supported initially by defense demand, jet engine technology rapidly
advanced and relatively quickly replaced piston engines on the civilian aircraft
market (Malerba 1985, Langlois and Steinmueller 1999).
A recent study on the development in Europe and the United States of
intraocular lenses as a technology for effectively solving the cataract problem
documents the considerable period of time when those lenses, and the surgery
Demmand, innovation, and the dynamics of market structure 389
needed to implant them, were considered by many ophthalmologists to be inferior
to other means of treating cataracts, and for many patients, that probably was the
case. The persistence of a group of ophthalmologists who had faith in intraocular
lenses, and their ability to convince a number of patients that this was the best
treatment for them, provided a market and a testing ground for the development of
intraocular lenses to the point where they became very effective, and the surgery
safe and more or less routine (Metcalfe and Andrew 2005).
As is well known, the early work which started progress toward the Internet was
funded by the American Department of Defense because of its own special needs.
Those needs called for something like a packet switched network, as an alternative to
a circuit switched network. As that technology developed, a new group of
experimental users joined the market, principally academic researchers, who used
ARPANET to connect research laboratories. As a result of further development, the
Internet became a technology capable of attracting a large market of users
(McKnight and Bailey 1998).
The Internet case is not so much one of a new technology replacing an older one
in a given market, but rather one in which an initial niche market, and a group of
experimental users, enabled a new technology to survive and advance to the point
where it could tap a major new market. There are many examples of important new
technologies that developed this way. Thus, around the world the market for
automobiles was initially almost exclusively a market made up of sportsmen, and
experimenters. The same is true for the market for early aircraft (Prencipe 2000).
Scholars of technological change have not ignored demand in its effects on
innovation and on market structure (Von Hippel 1988). Indeed they long have seen
the size and structure of demand as important factors influencing the magnitude and
orientation of inventive effort. And scholars concerned with the factors influencing
industry structure also have paid attention to the structure of demand, the sensitivity
of customers to advertising, and the strength bandwagon and network effects, in
determining whether or not the industry gets concentrated (see in particular Sutton
1991 and 1998).
The focus on the demand side in this paper has been different than in either of
these research traditions, but is in some cases strongly complementary. The
argument has been that the presence of markets not well served by incumbent
firms, and of experimental users, often has been an important factor permitting
new technologies to effectively enter a field, and that when new technologies enter
these submarkets through new firms, this can have a profound, long-run effect on
industry structure. We think that this has been an important phenomenon in the
history of a number of industries, and deserves more attention from economists
than it thus far has been given.
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Appendix 1
The model
Firm capabilities: directions in attribute space
The basic firm-specific characteristics in the model are the fractions θ1, θ2 of R&D
expenditures that are devoted to improving the two product attributes. These are
determined for each firm at the start of each run by a draw on the uniform
distribution. With total R&D expenditure at t equal to R, the R&D devoted to the
improvement of attribute i is Rit=θi Rt.
Here, i=2 denotes performance and i=1 denotes cheapness.
Firm capabilities: movement along trajectories
Capability trajectories for all firms begin at the attribute point Z=(Z1, Z2). For each
attribute, the design improvement produced in a single period is an increasing
function of R-D devoted to that attribute and the remaining distance, Li−Xi, to the
maximum value, Li, of that attribute. Specifically,
change i ¼ a0 Rið Þa1 Li  Xið Þa2 ð9Þ
Firms’ finance, R-D and pricing decisions
New firms starting at point Z have a loan that gets them started. Absent other sources
of funds, firms spend a constant fraction of their loan on R-D in each period, so long
as there are remaining funds, or revenues from sales, begin to come in. If the funds
are exhausted before a marketable design is achieved, firms exit.
If and when a marketable design is achieved before the initial loan is all spent,
gross profits become positive. Gross profits are defined as revenues from sales
minus the costs of production.
p ¼ MpMk; ð10Þ
M is the number of units sold, p is their price, and k is unit production cost. A
fraction, φ, of this profit is returned to investors each period until the loan is paid off.
R&D expenditures are financed out of the remainder.
Production costs, kt, are the inverse of the cheapness attribute of the firm’s current
capability. Price is obtained by adding a mark-up, μ, to costs:
p ¼ k 1þ mð Þ ð11Þ
The mark-up, μ, is initially set equal for all firms, but subsequently it varies over
time as a function of the market share that has been achieved. Specifically:
μt ¼ 0:9μt1 þ 0:1 mi= η mið Þ½  ð12Þ
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where η is a notional elasticity of demand (equal to 2 in the first market and to 4
in the new market) and mi is the firm’s market share. Thus the mark-up is constant
when it is equal to the value appropriate to a firm with market share m in an
asymmetric Cournot equilibrium.
R&D expenditures, R, are determined as follows:
Rt;¼ φ  π 1 σð Þ ð13Þ
The excess gross profits after debt repayment and R-D expenditures, is invested in
an account, Bt, that yields the interest rate, r, in each period.
Demand
The overall market consists of a large number of “submarkets,” the number being a
parameter of the model. A submarket buys from at most one supplier in each period.
If a purchase is made, the number of units purchased equals the merit of design, M,
of the product offered by that supplier. For a product with cheapness X1=1/p and
performance X2, the merit of design is given by:
M ¼ b0 X1  X1minð Þb1 X2  X2minð Þb2 ð14Þ
where b0 is a scale parameter, and X1min and X2min are the threshold levels for
cheapness and performance. If there is more than one computer that meets threshold
demand requirements, that has M greater than zero, the probability that customers in
a submarket will buy from a particular supplier is positively related to the merit of
that supplier’s design, and to the suppliers overall market share. Specifically:
Pi ¼ c0 Mið Þc1 mi þ d1ð Þc2 ð15Þ
where c0 is specified so that the sum of the probabilities adds to one. M denotes
the “merit” of a product. “m” is the market share in terms of the fraction of total
sales revenues accounted for by that product. The constant “d1” assures that new
firms entering the market have a positive probability of making a sale.
In the initial runs, there is a class of customers, who have the same preferences. In the
runs that explore what happens after new basic technology becomes available, two
additional classes of customers are added to the model. First, there is a group of
experimental users. Experimental users are represented by a fraction of the submarkets,
determined by a model parameter. Second, there are potential new users, who have very
different preferences than the users that had been served previously. In particular, they
value cheapness greatly, and place less value on performance.
Long run convergence
If and when the computers using the new component technology achieve threshold
levels of merit for the old customers, those computers enter the set being scanned by
those submarkets. If those new computers achieve levels of merit exceeding those of
the old computers, they can take over the old market as well as the new.
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Adoption of new component technologies
Adoption of the new technology takes place in two steps. First, a firm must perceive
the new technology. Perception is a stochastic process that depends on the current
technological position of the potential adopter in relation to the technological frontier
in the old technology and on the progress realized by the new technology:
Prperc ¼ ziuj þ zvh
 .
2
h iλ
ð16Þ
where Prperc is the probability of perceiving the new technology, zij is fraction of
the old technological frontier covered by firm i and zh is the fraction of the new
technology frontier covered by the best-practice new generation’s firms. The
parameter l measures the general difficulty of perceiving the new technology.
Once firms have perceived the possibility of adoption, they have to invest in order
to acquire the new technology. Adoption costs (Cad) entail a fixed cost, Fad, equal for
all firms, and the payment of a fraction q of firms’ accumulated budget, linked to
factors like the training of engineers and the like. Thus,
Cad ¼ Fad þ qBt ð17Þ
Firms whose budget does not cover the fixed costs or whose profit rate is negative
cannot adopt the new technology.
Exit
Firms exit the market when their budget becomes negative (because current profits
are insufficient to pay back the due fraction of the outstanding debt) and/or when
their rate of profit becomes negative and it has been falling faster than a given rate (a
parameter of the model) over the past four periods.
Specifically, the rate of profit is defined as:
πi;t ¼ Bi;t  Debti;t
B0  1þ rð Þ ttb;ið Þ
where pi;t is the profit rate of firm i at time t, Bi,t is the budget of firm i at time t,
Debti,t is the debt of firm i at time t, B0 is the initial budget, r=0.025 is the one
period interest rate and tb is the birth time of firm i.
Let us then define a weighted change of the rate of profit as
bpi;t ¼ bpi;t1  1 wð Þ þ pi;t  pi;t1
   w ð18Þ
where w=0.25 is a parameter
Firms then exit the market when
πi;t < 0
bπi;t < VRP
( )
and
VRP=−0.03 is parameter
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Firms exit also when their budget or their R&D expenditures becomes too small.
In particular:
Bit < 0 or R > Rmin; where Rmin is a parameter ð19Þ
Appendix 2
We provide here a complete list of the notation used in the model:
Indices:
& i index for firms,
& t index for time periods,
General model parameters
& T=150 time horizon
& TMP=30 time of introduction of new microprocessor technology
& TfTR=0 birth period of first generation firms with transistor technology
& TfMP =35 birth period of second generation firms with microprocessor
technology
Exogenous industry characteristics
– FTR=6 number of first generation firms with transistor technology
– FMP=20 number of second generation firms with microprocessor technology
– r=0.025 one period interest rate
– b0=0.02 gives a scale for the utility function
– b1MF=0.3, b1PC= 1.15 exponent of cheapness in the utility function
– b2MF=1.1, b2PC= 0.35 exponent of performance in the utility function
– c1MF=2, c1PC= 2 exponent of utility in the probability of selling function
– c2MF=2, c2PC= 0.1 exponent of share in the probability of selling function
– ηPC=4 , ηMF= 2 elasticity of demand
– LcTR=2,000, LcMP=9,000 limit of cheapness for technology
– LpTR=8,000, LpMP= 9,000 limit of performance for technology
– TcMF=400, TcPC= 2,000 minimum value of cheapness for entering the market
– TpMF=4,000, TpPC= 500 minimum value of performance for entering the market
– submMF=100 number of submarkets that create the mainframe market
– submPC= 100 number of submarkets that create the PC market
Endogenous industry characteristic
– LeaderPC t leader in PC market at time t
– LeaderMF t leader in MF market at time t
Exogenous firm characteristics
– μ0= 0.1 initial mark-up of firms
– =0.1 fraction of profits invested in R&D
– B=9 initial budget given to first generation firms
– Br%= 0.45 initial budget reduction factor for second generation firms
– σ=0.15 fraction of profit used for debt pay back
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– a1=1 exponent of distance from corner in design change function
– a2=0.65 exponent of R&D expenditure in design change function
– u=1 exponent of the distance from corner in the function that defines
probability of adoption
– v=1 exponent of distance of the best-practice new generation’s firm in the
function that defines probability of adoption
– l=15 exponent that measures the general difficulty of perceiving the new
technology
– q=0.6 cost of adoption in terms of budget fraction
– Fad= 2.5 fixed cost of adoption
Endogenous firm characteristics:
– Mi,t merit of design of a computer produced by firm i at time t
– Xc i,t value of cheapness of computer i at time t
– Xp i,t value of performance of computer i at time t
– mi,t market share of firm i at time t
– pi,t price of a mainframe/PC produced by firm i at time t
– μi,t mark-up of firm i at time t
– pi,t profits of firm i at time t
– Ri,t R&D spending of firm i at time t
Appendix 3: Sensitivity and robustness analysis
Following Dawid (2004) and Dawid and Reimann (2005), we carried out sensitivity
and robustness analysis on the model by generating 100 different profiles of the
basic model parameters, except those that are at the centre of our analysis, i.e. the
bandwagon (c1 in Eq. 7) and design sensitivity (c2.in Eq. 7). The profiles were
generated randomly, where each parameter was drawn from a uniform distribution
bounded by a conceptually plausible range. Each particular setting for our control
parameters was run over all 100 profiles and the results obtained were averaged over
these runs. As an additional robustness check we repeated the procedure with
Table 1 Parameters drawn from a uniform distribution bounded by a conceptually plausible range
Parameter Lower bound Upper bound
1 μ0 (mark-up) 0.09 0.11
2  (fraction of profits invested in R&D) 0.09 0.11
3 B (budget) 8.1 9.9
4 σ (% of profit used to repay initial loan) 0.135 0.165
5 Q (budget fraction for adoption) 0.54 0.66
6 Fad (fixed cost of adoption) 2.25 2.75
7 Br% (budget reduction second gen.) 0.405 0.495
8 b1MF (parameter of utility function) 0.27 0.33
9 b2MF (parameter of utility function) 0.99 1.21
10 U (parameter of probability of adoption function) 0.9 1.1
11 V (parameter of probability of adoption function) 0.9 1.1
12 l (parameter of probability of adoption function) 13.5 16.5
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Table 2 Simulation summary statistics: t=150
Figure 3 bw=2 ds=2 (no MP no second generation)
H A L1 S
Mean 0.59522 0 0.988 0
Std 0.28112 0 0.10894 0
Max 1 0 1 0
Min 0 0 0 0
Upper tail confidence interval (99%) 0.61816 0 0.99689 0
Lower tail confidence interval (99%) 0.57229 0 0.97911 0
Figure 3 bw=5 ds=2 (no MP no second generation)
H A L1 S
Mean 0.99287 0 0.994 0
Std 0.077869 0 0.077266 0
Max 1 0 1 0
Min 0 0 0 0
Upper tail confidence interval (99%) 0.99922 0 1.0003 0
Lower tail confidence interval (99%) 0.98652 0 0.9877 0
Figure 3 bw=2 ds=5 (no MP no second generation)
H A L1 S
Mean 0.987 0 0.993 0
Std 0.099201 0 0.083414 0
Max 1 0 1 0
Min 0 0 0 0
Upper tail confidence interval (99%) 0.99509 0 0.99981 0
Lower tail confidence interval (99%) 0.97891 0 0.98619 0
Figure 5 bw=5 ds=2 (MP and second generation)
H A L1 S
Mean 0.99825 0.113 0.992 0.12
Std 0.014896 0.3199 0.089129 0.32512
Max 1 2 1 1
Min 0.84305 0 0 0
Upper tail confidence interval (99%) 0.99947 0.1391 0.99927 0.14653
Lower tail confidence interval (99%) 0.99704 0.086901 0.98473 0.093474
Figure 5 bw=2 ds=5 (MP and second generation)
H A L1 S
Mean 0.99489 0.104 0.99 0.112
Std 0.049827 0.3119 0.099549 0.31552
Max 1 2 1 1
Min 0.5 0 0 0
Upper tail confidence interval (99%) 0.99895 0.12945 0.99812 0.13774
Lower tail confidence interval (99%)% 0.99082 0.078553 0.98188 0.086257
Figure 6a bw=5 ds=2 exp 0.1
H A L1 S
Mean 0.96686 0.576 0.965 0.59915
Std 0.05364 0.50644 0.18387 0.47792
Max 1 2 1 1
Min 0.5016 0 0 0.0015458
Upper tail confidence interval (99%) 0.97123 0.61732 0.98 0.63814
Low CI 99% 0.96248 0.53468 0.95 0.56016
Figure 6a bw=5 ds=2 exp 0.2
H A L1 S
Mean 0.9245 0.974 0.771 0.97203
Std 0.044786 0.22666 0.4204 0.15609
Max 1 2 1 1
Min 0.52245 0 0 0.011953
Upper tail confidence interval (99%) 0.92815 0.99249 0.8053 0.98477
Lower tail confidence interval (99%) 0.92084 0.95551 0.7367 0.9593
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another 100 random profiles in the same manner and tested several of our qualitative
insights obtained with the initial set of profiles. In all these cases our findings were
confirmed by such a check. Summarizing, all the results were found to be very
robust under the settings we discussed above, namely 100 distinctly different runs,
Figure 6a bw=5 ds=2 exp 0.3
H A L1 S
Mean 0.89916 0.992 0.644 0.99999
Std 0.030678 0.1263 0.47905 0.00025227
Max 1 2 1 1
Min 0.80136 0 0 0.99202
Upper tail confidence interval (99%) 0.90166 1.0023 0.68308 1
Lower tail confidence interval (99%) 0.89665 0.9817 0.60492 0.99997
Figure 6b bw=2 ds=5 exp 0.1
H A L1 S
Mean 0.74107 0.872 0.887 0.90982
Std 0.23481 0.35741 0.31675 0.27595
Max 1 2 1 1
Min 0.49332 0 0 0
Upper tail confidence interval (99%) 0.76022 0.90116 0.91284 0.93233
Lower tail confidence interval (99%) 0.72191 0.84284 0.86116 0.88731
Figure 6b bw=2 ds=5 exp 0.2
H A L1 S
Mean 0.52765 0.996 0.804 0.999
Std 0.10087 0.12649 0.39717 0.031623
Max 1 2 1 1
Min 0.33334 0 0 0
Upper tail confidence interval (99%) 0.53588 1.0063 0.8364 1.0016
Lower tail confidence interval (99%) 0.51942 0.98568 0.7716 0.99642
Figure 6b bw=2 ds=5 exp 0.3
H A L1 S
Mean 0.50675 0.994 0.701 0.99906
Std 0.05873 0.12641 0.45805 0.029721
Max 1 2 1 1
Min 0.33343 0 0 0.060155
Upper tail confidence interval (99%) 0.51154 1.0043 0.73837 1.0015
Lower tail confidence interval (99%) 0.50196 0.98369 0.66363 0.99664
Figure 8 bw=5 ds=2 (niche market, convergence)
H A L1 S
Mean 0.39824 1.002 0 1
Std 0.064839 0.12654 0 7.034e-017
Max 0.99994 2 0 1
Min 0.19005 0 0 1
Upper tail confidence interval (99%) 0.40353 1.0123 0 1
Lower tail confidence interval (99%) 0.39295 0.99168 0 1
Figure 8 bw=2 ds=5 (niche market, convergence)
H A L1 S
Mean 0.35077 0.992 0 1
Std 0.07265 0.11811 0 6.6275e-017
Max 1 2 0 1
Min 0.20318 0 0 1
Upper tail confidence interval (99%) 0.3567 1.0016 0 1
Lower tail confidence interval (99%) 0.34485 0.98236 0 1
H=Herfindahl index
A=Adoptions
L1=Leadership of first generation firms
S=Share of new technology firms in first market
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with profiles based on parameter ranges that were determined by plausibility checks
beforehand. (Table 1).
Table 2 reports the essential statistics for the main variables of interest in each of
the simulation runs presented in the paper.
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